system'. 9 Indeed, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe has suggested that a 'bad example' set by the UK could mark 'the beginning of the weakening of the Convention system and probably after a while' 10 its dissolution. Against this background, this article reflects upon the prisoner voting saga (to date at least) and the evolution of the 'British' challenge to the Court over recent years. To be clear, the term 'British' is employed for convenience, mainly to reflect the positions adopted by the British government and certain Westminster politicians at various, relevant stages, and so does not imply that there is a single, British 11 view toward the Convention, or with respect to prisoner voting. The article proceeds in four parts.
Part one offers a critical perspective on the key prisoner voting judgments delivered by the Court over 2005-2010, starting with Hirst. We shall examine why that judgment was controversial, firstly, from the perspective of the standard of review Strasbourg employed (in respect of which there was some disagreement), and secondly, as the judgment was ambiguous. We shall then see that subsequent Strasbourg case law on prisoner voting gave out mixed messages as to the requirements of the ECHR in this field.
Part two examines how the Strasbourg Court sought to use its influence to force the UK to comply with Hirst, resorting to its Art 46 powers. But we shall also observe how the British government and British MPs reacted to this, the latter by voting overwhelmingly against a change in the law (February 2011). We shall see that this gave rise to a certain amount of brinkmanship, or so it seemed, between the UK and Strasbourg, and how the latter reacted via the Grand Chamber judgment in Scoppola v Italy No 3 (May 2012).
The analysis in part three might at first appear to be a digression, since it adopts a broader perspective, addressing the domestic context in terms of why the Court's influence on the UK has become so contentious in recent years. It is hoped, however, that the reader will appreciate that this perspective provides part of the explanation as to why the prisoner voting issue has become regarded as the focal point for what in fact is a broader controversy. The reality, it seems, is that the substantive (prisoner voting) matter has assumed secondary importance to a broader debate about the UK's relationship with Strasbourg, the latter being regarded as too intrusive in relation to the former. The third part of this article therefore provides an important perspective on the saga, helping to explain why, even though the Strasbourg Court's judgments, especially the Court's 2012 ruling in Scoppola, might be regarded as having only a mild, law-reforming effect, there remains real resistance to reform on the part of some, as a matter of principle, it seems.
Against that background the final part of this article reflects upon the saga as a whole. It is submitted that there are lessons to be derived for the UK and for the Court.
establishes an individual right to vote. 13 That said, the ruling was controversial within the Court itself for it divided the Grand Chamber (12 to 5), the division being, apparently, about a difference of approach as to the appropriate review function to be performed by Strasbourg. We examine this below, before we comment on a further aspect of why Hirst and the case law that followed in 2010 were contentious; the 2005 judgment was ambiguous, and later rulings adopted different readings of the case.
Hirst and the margin of appreciation
The controversy over the standard of review centred upon the margin of appreciation. In essence, the UK position, largely endorsed by the minority, was that the British blanket ban on convicted prisoners voting (based mainly upon section 3(1) of the Representation of the People Act 1983 (ROPA 1983)) 14 was reasonable, and that Strasbourg should acknowledge that, by accepting that British law came within the margin of appreciation, there being no violation of the ECHR. British law, it was submitted, was proportionate since it lasted only as long as the imprisonment itself, and only applied to those convicted of 'crimes sufficiently serious, to warrant an immediate custodial sentence'. 15 Moreover, there were thirteen European countries (as of 2005) where prisoners were unable to vote, and a variety of approaches were taken by democratic States outside Europe. 16 Finding a violation of Art 3 Prot 1, the Court observed that the ban was automatic and covered 'a wide range of offenders and sentences, from one day to life and from relatively minor offences to offences of the utmost gravity'. 17 It acknowledged that only 'a minority of Contracting States' 18 (no more than 13) had blanket bans or made no provision for allowing prisoners to vote, but stated that, 'even if no common European approach to the problem [could] be discerned, [that could not] in itself be determinative of the issue'. As to the Court's entitlement to hold that British law contravened the Convention, even though the ban was framed in primary legislation (here the Court referred to the 'weight' 19 to be attached to the British Parliament's position), it was observed that the British Parliament had not seriously debated the appropriateness of the ban in modern times, and certainly not from the perspective articulated by the Court, with its eye to justifying restrictions on 'the right of a convicted prisoner to vote' (emphasis added). 14 This stipulates that all convicted prisoners are ineligible to vote in parliamentary and local elections whilst they are detained in a penal institution. Those imprisoned for contempt and default, and on remand, may vote. For a very informative document on the domestic context to the prisoner voting saga, see House of Commons Library, Standard Note (SN/PC/01764), 'Prisoner Voting Rights', 15 Jan 2014. 15 Hirst GC [51] , cf the excluded categories of prisoners noted in n 14. See also [52] and [77] . 16 Hirst GC [47] . 17 Hirst GC [77] , and see Anchugov and Gladkov n 3 above at [105] . 18 Hirst GC [81] . See text accompanying n 171 infra for updated figures. 19 Hirst GC [79] . See the joint concurring opinion of Judges Tulkens and Zagrebelsky, and the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Lorenzen, Kovler and Jebens at [7] . On the absence of a proper domestic debate in the Russian context, see Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia n 3 above at [109] . 20 The Hirst Grand Chamber noted that 'there is no evidence that Parliament has ever sought to weigh the competing interests or to assess the proportionality of a blanket ban on the right of a convicted prisoner to vote'. There had not been 'any substantive debate by members of the legislature on the continued justification in light of modern-day penal policy and of current human rights standards for maintaining such a general restriction on the right of prisoners to vote', Hirst GC [79]; see also [22] , pointing out that s 3 ROPA was a re-enactment, without debate, of legislation from 1969, which in turn dated back to 1870.
As the emphasised part of the passage just quoted indicates, Hirst required ECHR States to adopt a rights-based model for (convicted) prisoner voting. 21 The judgment did not expressly state this, but it was the necessary implication of the ruling, which held that it was unacceptable under 'modern-day penal policy and current human rights standards', 22 for the UK to have a general, automatic and thus indiscriminate denial of the right of convicted prisoners to vote. What was at stake was 'not a privilege', whilst '[i]n the twenty-first century', 'the presumption in a democratic State' had to be 'in favour of inclusion', 23 prisoners not forfeiting their 'Convention rights merely because of [their] status as a person detained following conviction', or simply because public opinion favoured this. 24 The right could be heavily qualified, but British law was closed to considerations related to its proportionality, the Grand Chamber adopting a rather in abstracto approach to s 3 ROPA 1983, 25 which was 'a blunt instrument', imposing 'a blanket restriction on all convicted prisoners', 26 stripping 'of their Convention right to vote a significant category of persons' (emphasis added), and doing so 'in a way which is indiscriminate'. The Court stated in paragraph 82 of the judgment that the ban:
'applie [d] automatically to such prisoners, irrespective of the length of their sentence and irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their individual circumstances. Such a general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right must be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide that margin might be, and as being incompatible with Art 3 of Prot No. 1'. 27 So, contrary to the British submissions, section 3 ROPA fell outside the margin of appreciation; that margin was 'wide' but not 'all-embracing '. 28 Insisting that the Court had been correct to reject the British government's arguments as to the limited review function to be employed, in his separate opinion Judge Caflisch argued that Strasbourg had the authority to set minimum standards, and here it had defined the 'parameters to be respected by democratic States when limiting the right to participate in votes or elections'. 29 The very purpose of the ECHR was to make the national laws of contracting States subject to 'European control'; 30 Strasbourg was not bound to simply defer to the UK, holding that its law was reasonable and so find As for the domestic courts, they had treated the human rights compatibility of the ban as a mainly political matter, Hirst GC [80] . 21 . The Court found a violation of Art 3 Prot 1 in Strasbourg's capacity to 'determine in the last resort' whether that Article had been complied with, its role being to ensure that the 'very essence' of the right in question was not infringed, and that restrictions on it were imposed for 'legitimate aim[s]' and were not 'disproportionate', Hirst GC [62] . It had to assess whether exclusion 'of any groups or categories of the general population' from the franchise were 'reconcilable with the underlying purposes of Art 3 of Prot No 1' ibid. 25 The majority argued that this was not so, see [72] , but the minority disagreed, see Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Wildhaber et al [8] . 26 no violation, on the basis that the national legislature and domestic courts had adopted positions on the matter and as there was no clear European consensus on the issue.
However, five dissenting judges 31 (which included the Court's then President (Wildhaber) and its subsequent President (Costa)) appeared to question this, at least on the facts of Hirst. Adopting a wide margin of appreciation (deferential) approach, 32 they cited the politically sensitive nature of the prisoner voting issue, the fact that the right to vote was an implied right read into Art 3 Prot 1, and the absence of a clear enough European standard on prisoner disenfranchisement in 2005. For them the Grand Chamber was being too activist in a field that should have been reserved for the UK in the exercise of its margin of appreciation (the Court was 'not a legislator and should be careful not to assume legislative functions'). 33 From that point of departure, the dissenters also strongly implied that the majority had adopted their own preferred solution to the substantive issue, losing sight of the Court's international status: '[o]ur own opinion' on the prisoner voting issue 'matter[ed] little'. In a similar vein Judge Costa argued that the majority had confused 'the ideal to be attained' (original emphasis) -which was 'to bring the isolation of convicted prisoners to an end, even when they have been convicted of the most serious crimes, and to prepare for their reintegration into society and citizenship' 34 -and the appropriate deferential (wide margin of appreciation) approach required of the Court for the case at hand. As the joint dissenters put it, Strasbourg should not 'impose on national legal systems an obligation either to abolish disenfranchisement for prisoners or to allow it only to a very limited extent' (emphasis added).
Mixed messages, and idealism, not self-restraint from Strasbourg?
As this last passage reveals, the dissenters doubted whether the Court genuinely had left the UK with a wide (remaining) margin of appreciation within which to amend domestic law. As they read the judgment, only two reform options were available: restore the vote to prisoners in the post-tariff phase of detention (such as Hirst; the tariff part of the sentence relating to the minimum period to be served for retribution and deterrence), or amend domestic law such that only judges could disenfranchise prisoners as part of sentencing.
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In fact, Hirst was highly ambiguous here. On the one hand, it was capable of a minimalist reading. The Grand Chamber stated that it would not direct the UK how to amend its domestic law, implying that it was adopting an appropriately restrained approach by doing so. 36 On the other hand, it criticised the fact that the courts in the UK did not identify a 'direct link' between removal of the right to vote and incarceration. 37 It also stated that 'the severe measure of disenfranchisement' could not be 'undertaken lightly', and that 'the principle of proportionality require [d] Arguably the reference to proportionality suggested that the specific 'conduct' (crime committed) had to match the 'sanction' (disenfranchisement) for the individual prisoner concerned, the intervention of a judge being best suited to that. 41 This was the approach adopted, in April 2010, in the chamber judgment, Frodl v Austria. 42 It paid lipservice to the margin of appreciation citing what it referred to as the 'Hirst test', which entailed that, 'besides ruling out automatic and blanket restrictions' it was 'an essential element that the decision on disenfranchisement should be taken by a judge, taking into account the particular circumstances, and that there must be a link between the offence committed and issues relating to elections and democratic institutions'. 43 Frodl stated: 'The essential purpose of these criteria is to establish disenfranchisement as an exception even in the case of convicted prisoners, ensuring that such a measure is accompanied by specific reasoning given in an individual decision explaining why in the circumstances of the specific case disenfranchisement was necessary, taking the above elements into account'.
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Frodl was confirmed when Austria's Art 43(1) request that it be referred to the Grand Chamber for a rehearing was rejected. Austria dutifully amended its law soon after this, although in fact, and as we note later, aspects of Frodl were later overturned by the Grand Chamber in Scoppola (2012). Before then, in January 2011 in the chamber judgment in that case the Court applied Frodl insofar as judicial disenfranchisement and adequate reasoning by a domestic court in respect of the nature and gravity of the offence committed was a general principle of the Art 3 Protocol 1 prisoner voting case law. 45 
By contrast, in Greens and M.T. v UK
46 (November 2010), a near identical case to Hirst, which was sandwiched in between the Austrian and Italian judgments, the Court adopted the 'minimalist' reading of the 2005 Grand Chamber judgment. It merely cited paragraph 82 of Hirst, 47 indicating that it was the automatic and blanket nature of restrictions on prisoner voting which were unacceptable, and emphasising the great latitude that the UK had to amend domestic law. 48 The idealist passages from Hirst noted above were not cited and the judgment implied that Frodl could be confined to its facts. 50 Hirst itself had been unclear. Greens might have backtracked on it; given the ambiguity of the 2005 judgment one cannot say for sure. Frodl either made Strasbourg law more explicit or significantly advanced it. But the fact that a reference to the Grand Chamber was rejected indicated that Frodl, which had explicitly referred to the 'Hirst test' and required that disenfranchisement be 'an exception even in the case of convicted prisoners', was final, and so 'good' Strasbourg law. That was particularly striking given that Hirst had been controversial, the minority accusing the majority, in effect, of judicial activism.
We shall return to the (probably, now predictable) criticisms of these 2005 and 2010 rulings in the last section of this article. For now, however, our focus shifts to the enforcement of Hirst. Invoking the pilot judgment procedure 56 Greens noted that several thousand British prisoner voting applications had reached Strasbourg, and the potential for many more. 57 However, it indicated that it was not intent on using these cases to rack up judgments against the UK, or using them to try to fine it into compliance. 58 Adopting a 'constitutional' model of review, 59 Greens indicated that Strasbourg was ready to dispense with all follow-up cases (around 1,500 were registered), 60 and future comparable cases, without compensation 61 -if the requested proposals for legislative reform noted above were tabled, and appropriate reform followed. That said, there was an implied threat of minimal costs awards in respect of the many Hirst-like applications that had reached and could yet be made to Strasbourg by disenfranchised prisoners.
II -Enforcing

62
As students of the ECHR know, the Court's orders (like its judgments more generally) create international legal obligations, and these are not necessarily directly enforceable in domestic law, and so compliance may rely upon a cooperative approach from the (sovereign) respondent State. Then again, Convention States are unlikely to want to be exposed as being directly opposed to the Court, and willing to reject the obligations it may establish via its authoritative interpretation of the Convention, in a case directed against it, and which the State has undertaken to abide by (Art 46(1)). Doubtless it was for such reasons that over 2005-2010 the UK government never actually stated that it was not prepared to abide by Hirst. The influence of the 'unenforceable' orders made in Greens therefore resided in the international legal obligations the relevant judgments established, which were final and binding on the UK (Art 46(1)). Above all, however, their effectiveness rested on the assumption that the UK government would not be prepared to flout those obligations and the Court's authority, if forced into having to adopt a position on the matter -the orders turning the screw in that regard, so-to-speak. In Greens the UK (in reality, its government) was presented with an ultimatum: it had six months to either demonstrate its acceptance in principle of 55 yet to take place. 69 Rather, the initiators of the February 2011 debate were sharply critical of the Court for what they regarded as its general activism and intrusiveness; the essence of their argument on prisoner voting, nonetheless, was that British law was reasonable and should not be changed: it was perfectly acceptable, British MPs insisted, to temporarily disenfranchise those who had convicted an offence deemed serious enough to merit a custodial sentence. Moreover, in a debate which exposed some measure of anti-European sentiment on the part of some MPs, 70 as the motion put it, 'legislative decisions of this nature should be a matter for democratically-elected lawmakers'.
Greens
In reality, then, against the background of the Court's Art 46 orders the overwhelming vote in favour of retaining the British blanket ban was a threatened democratic, not government override in respect of Hirst. 'Threatened' -for the UK government, representing the UK on the international stage, had indicated that it was prepared to comply with Hirst, and it was not bound by the vote, so in that sense the vote did not conclude matters. 'Democratic override' -for, nonetheless, British MPs would have to agree to any amendment, and independently they were now sending a clear 'think again' 71 message to Strasbourg, the vote amounting to a 'right of recall, the right of review and the right of challenge'. 72 There was also a 'barrage of hostile [antiStrasbourg] criticism' 73 in the press, unparalleled in the Court's 50-year history, according to the Court's Deputy Registrar.
This formed the context to the UK government's Art 43(1) request 74 that Greensand, in effect, Hirst -be reheard by the Grand Chamber. Of course, it was not expressed in the language of democratic override, but it sought to reinvigorate the debate about the margin of appreciation, and the division of opinion on that that had occurred back in Hirst. The essential argument was that Strasbourg should accommodate the British position, which was a reasonable one, now undoubtedly reflecting a 'principled view strongly held by many in the United Kingdom, and by their democratically accountable representatives' (emphasis added). A side-letter sent to the Committee of Ministers (supervising the implementation of Hirst) noted that the House of Commons debate was a direct reaction to the government's announcement that it intended to change the law. 
generated'
75 by the inconsistencies in the relevant Strasbourg law (which included the Frodl and Greens discrepancies), thereby enabling the UK to put domestic law on a Convention-compliant footing. 76 The timing of the UK third party intervention 77 in Scoppola was such that it coincided with the assumption by the UK of the chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers, a key feature of which was the Brighton Declaration of April 2012, discussed below. One aspect of that, as we shall observe, was the place of the margin of appreciation and the principle of subsidiarity in the Convention regime of supervision. In the meantime, and predictably, the UK submissions in Scoppola, presented in person by the British Attorney General, took that theme up, seeking once again to reopen the margin of appreciation debate in issue in Hirst. 78 Prisoner voting was a social policy issue, 79 such that Strasbourg should respect a decision made by a sovereign Parliament, unless its solution was manifestly unreasonable. The appropriate function for the Court was that of 'review' of a State's domestic law -affording the widest of margins given the issues in question -not 'judgmental substitution'. 80 So, whilst the British government fully accepted that the Court had the final word on the compatibility of British law with the Convention, 81 and whilst the principles of law established in Hirst were not disputed, their application to the British context was. Strasbourg was urged to 're-visit' that case, which would be 'a brave step, [but] more importantly, the correct one in principle'.
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Strasbourg stands its ground, but seeks appeasement(?) (Scoppola (Grand Chamber, 2012)) It is worth pausing at this stage to consider the Court's position. It was, in effect, being asked to set aside its Art 46 orders and reverse the outcome (if not the law) of Hirst. That would indeed have been a 'brave' step, for it would have amounted to a recognition of the fact that it had erred by not affording the UK a broader margin of appreciation in the 2005 case. The message communicated to all States might have been that certain Grand Chamber judgments could be reopened later via a threatened democratic override from a balky Parliament. Of course, we cannot know if such considerations influenced the Court's decision to reject the Greens rehearing request. As to the Scoppola Grand Chamber judgment the position adopted was that Hirst had already decided the blanket prisoner voting ban issue, and that there was no good basis in law for it to depart from that precedent in 2012. The Grand Chamber stated that: 92 setting generous boundaries for Art 3 Prot 1, as was demonstrated by the no violation finding in Scoppola itself (by 16 votes to one, thereby overturning the chamber judgment), despite the wide-ranging restrictions on prisoner voting in issue. The Italian legislator had decided that restrictions applied in specific contexts, demonstrating that the justification for restrictions on prisoner voting rights could be basic and general. Its model came within the wide margin of appreciation the Court was (now?) prepared to grant, it not mattering that there was, in fact, automatic denial of the vote to those 83 Scoppola GC at [95] . 84 Interestingly, the implication of what it said may be that a Grand Chamber judgment -the strongest expression of European control -can be re-examined subsequently, and changed in a way that potentially downgraded human rights protection. But only if there were sound reasons connected to the broader evolution of Convention law, or, as it put, developments on 'the European and Convention levels'. 85 91 See n 39-40 supra. 92 Frodl had taken 'a broad view of the principles set out' in Hirst, one which the Scoppola Grand Chamber did 'not fully share', [99] . The Court's survey of comparative law revealed that 'arrangements for restricting the right of convicted prisoners to vote vary considerably from one national legal system to another, particularly as to the need for such restrictions to be ordered by a court', Scoppola GC [101] . categories of prisoners identified by the legislature, and that, in fact, Italian law was harsher in some contexts than UK law. 93 Thus, following Hirst (or the version of that case endorsed by the Grand Chamber in 2012) Strasbourg still required observance of a minimum European standard -some form of rights-based approach to convicted prisoner voting -but made it very clear that the model could be very basic and that the boundaries for reform within which the UK had to work really were wide 94 (and, arguably, more so than Hirst had granted, at least as the dissenters in that case saw things). Was this an example of 'strategic judging'? 95 Commenting on Scoppola, the British Attorney General referred to the 'in-built flexibility' that the relevant law had gained compared to Hirst, one which led him to 'think that… we had actually been quite successful [ the current blanket ban -was noted in the introduction to this article. At that stage, the official position was that the UK was under an international law obligation to implement the relevant Strasbourg ruling(s), but that Parliament, i.e. MPs, had a 'right' to refuse to do so (leaving the UK in breach of international law). 100 Nonetheless, the new Minister of Justice left no doubt that his own personal view is that the Court has aggrandised its jurisdiction, 101 and that reform of the Strasbourg system further to the Brighton Declaration is imperative.
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The Bill's Draft status entailed that it was issued for consultation, before being formally introduced to Parliament. The saga therefore rolled on into 2013 as the Draft Bill, and the wider context to Hirst, was the subject of detailed scrutiny by the Joint Committee on Prisoner Voting (made up of 6 MPs and 6 peers) This echoed Strasbourg's rights-based approach. Significantly, however, the Committee's conclusions were primarily based on its own assessment of the relevant British law and its historical evolution, 'regardless' 106 of the Convention, and it also treated the matter of whether the UK 'should' comply with Hirst as a separate issue, as we discuss below. Recognising, nonetheless, that the decision on whether to comply with Hirst or not was ultimately for Parliament, the Report was clear that on that the balance of the argument was, in its view, very much in favour of compliance. After all, the change in the For a government discussion document examining, amongst other things, the enforcement options available to the Committee of Ministers/ Council of Europe, and the UK's potential financial liabilities, see 'Written Submission by HMG (VEP0050)' (16 October 2013), available from the website for Joint Select Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill, see n 6 supra. Since the entry into force of Protocol 14, there is also the possibility of 'infringement proceedings', see Arts 46(4)-(5), ECHR, although these lack 'bite' and have not been employed to date. 104 n 7 supra [155] ('the arguments for relaxing this prohibition are, on any rational assessment, persuasive. The Government has failed to advance a plausible case for the prohibition in terms of penal policydisenfranchisement linked to detention is an ineffective and arbitrary punishment, particularly for the tens of thousands of prisoners serving short sentences who pass through the prison system each year', para 231). 105 Ibid [156] . 106 Ibid [128] , emphasis added and see [154] . See chapters 2 and 3 of the Report, respectively examining the history of prisoner voting in the UK, and under the ECHR.
law required was only minor, and supported by the Committee; the 'small modification' 107 required simply did not merit defying Strasbourg with the major political consequences that could entail, let alone withdrawing from the Convention. 108 As we note below, 109 its broader conclusion -albeit by a majority -was that the UK should either comply with Strasbourg rulings directed against it or denounce the Convention.
The Joint Committee therefore proposed that the Draft Bill include a Convention-compliant reform proposal, 110 and not one to reinstate the blanket ban, and that the Bill be brought to the 2014-2015 session of Parliament (commencing June, 2014). Nonetheless, even if the government follows the Joint Committee's recommendation, amendments can be proposed in Parliament, so it is very likely that an option to retain the current ban will be tabled, and that British MPs will therefore debate whether to comply with Hirst, this following the February 2011 debate, when many MPs insisted that Strasbourg should back down.
In this last connection the Formal Minutes of the Joint Committee's meetings indicate that, in fact, it was divided by 7 votes to 3 (10 members being present for the relevant vote) on whether the UK should comply with Hirst. The minority supported non-compliance, on the basis that in Hirst, 'the ECtHR ha[d] exceeded its mandate in seeking to dictate to a democratically elected legislature the detailed arrangements regarding prisoner voting'.
111 According to the Chair of the Joint Committee, Nick Gibb MP, who formed part of the minority, matters had gone 'beyond… prisoner voting', the issue now being whether the UK should 'stand firm … to prevent future incursions into the sovereignty of our democracy'.
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As the Report itself acknowledged, '[u]nderlying' the Committee's whole inquiry was 'a far-reaching debate about the United Kingdom's future relationship with the European Court of Human Rights, the Convention system as a whole and our attachment to the rule of law'. 113 This was, apparently, at the root of the Committee's division. It is this 'debate', and its relevance to the resolution (or otherwise) of the prisoner voting saga, that we now turn to, for, it is submitted, it helps to explain precisely why Hirst has become such a focal point for disagreement.
III -The 'underlying… debate': the UK's 'relationship with the European Court of Human Rights'
Readers of this journal will know that, putting prisoner voting to one side, the Court has been under a very bright spotlight in the UK in recent years. Academics have defended it, arguing that much of the criticism is exaggerated and inaccurate.
114 This is not the place for a detailed examination of the various issues that have proved most controversial from the UK perspective. However, mention may be made of those cases involving the (initial) inability to deport certain suspected terrorists protected by the 'Chahal' 115 'real risk' principle (which the UK had previously challenged, unsuccessfully, at Strasbourg) 116 including that of Abu Qatada. 117 Even though no violation of Art 3 was found in that case, Strasbourg held that Art 6(1) constituted a bar to deportation, on the facts, breaking new legal ground in doing so (as it was entitled to, given its role as authoritative interpreter of the Convection).
The Abu Qatada case excited very considerable, hostile domestic reactions (amongst the press and some politicians) and, to its credit, the UK government went to considerable lengths to abide by the ruling, 118 demonstrating the importance it attaches to the UK's international obligations. Nevertheless, statements made to Parliament by the (Conservative) British Home Secretary saw her express exasperation with the ruling, 119 implying that European judges had acted unreasonably by disagreeing with the interpretation of Convention law (in particular that on Art 6(1)) adopted by the House of Lords (as it then was) when the case was heard under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA)).
120 She has called for the repeal of the HRA whilst the (Conservative) Justice Secretary has indicated that there will be a commitment to do just that in the next Conservative manifesto; 121 and that proposals will also be brought forward to 'curtail' the role of the Court in the UK, and to make the UK Supreme Court 'supreme'. More recently the Home Secretary has argued that withdrawal from the Convention is something that should be contemplated if this is regarded as necessary. We observe, then, that there is an internal (domestic law) and an external (international law) dimension to the 'underlying' issue of the UK's relationship with Strasbourg, and we shall now see that in some respects both have combined together in a negative way as far as the Court is concerned.
The HRA's 'alienating effect'?
In terms of the internal (domestic) aspect, the HRA might have been cited as offering a model example for giving effect to Convention rights in domestic law. Arguably, however, within the UK it has had 'an alienating effect' 122 more generally, and especially among those (a tabloid press, in particular) for whom '"Europe" is a dirty word').
123 Why? In the absence of a written constitution or a UK Bill of Rights, domestic human rights jurisprudence in the UK places very heavy reliance on the Convention. 124 The HRA requires domestic courts to 'take into account' Strasbourg jurisprudence and this they have done by an approach which entails that they will usually -but not always 125 -apply a clear and constant line of Strasbourg jurisprudence, especially that from the Grand Chamber. 126 This may have served to increase the potential for friction between Strasbourg and the UK insofar as the impression has been gained that the UK courts have become subservient to Strasbourg. Certainly some of the main (political) architects of the HRA 127 have strongly argued that the latter has occurred, whilst some senior judicial figures have spoken extra-judicially about the need for the courts to take a more hesitating approach to Strasbourg cases, in order to maintain the integrity of UK law.
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The former Lord Chief Justice has called for amendments to the HRA to make it clear that 'in this jurisdiction the Supreme Court is, at the very least, a court of equal standing with the Strasbourg Court'. 129 As well as this, there may also be a (flawed) perception that, with the HRA in place, and with Convention rights so carefully considered in the domestic context, by senior judges, Strasbourg should not be finding violations of the Convention with respect to the UK. Jack Straw -the Minister responsible for the introduction of the HRA in 1998 -has led the resistance to Hirst, and argued that since the HRA took effect it has been Strasbourg that has 'caused [the] real difficulty', 130 not the domestic courts (implying that the latter's interpretation of the Convention were reasonable, unlike the former's). This may reflect a failure to appreciate the Court's role as the authoritative interpreter of the Convention. 123 For a general perspective on the UK and Europe, and the constitutional issues arising, see Lord Neuberger, 'The British and Europe', 12 Feb 2014. 124 See S1(1) of the HRA, defining 'Convention rights' as those covered by Articles 2-14 of the Convention, and those protected by Protocol 1 (i.e. the rights the UK has accepted under the ECHR itself). 125 It may decline to do so in certain circumstances, enabling it to enter into a dialogue with the Strasbourg Court on the correct interpretation of Convention rights, something which has allowed the domestic courts to express their concerns with aspects of ECHR law, and which the Court has welcomed, leading to some adjustments to Strasbourg law cf Judge Bratza's separate opinion in Al-Khawaja v United Kingdom ECHR 2011; (2012) 54 EHRR 23 GC, and see text accompanying n 182 infra. Nevertheless, according to the Supreme Court, there are limits to such a dialogue, 'particularly where [as with prisoner voting] the matter has been already to a Grand Chamber'. In such circumstances, as the Supreme Court put it, it would 'have… to involve some truly fundamental principle of our law or some most egregious oversight or misunderstanding before it could be appropriate for [the Supreme Court] to contemplate an outright refusal to follow Strasbourg authority at the Grand Chamber level', per Lord Mance, Chester n 3 above at 
The ECHR: an external Bill of Rights and the margin of appreciation
In some respects, then, the introduction of the Convention into UK domestic law has not had the placating effect that may have been anticipated back in 1998. The HRA has, apparently, become regarded as more '"European" than British'
131 -so much so that the view has been taken that a 'fresh beginning' 132 is required as regards the model of human rights protection in domestic law. This was the conclusion of the Commission on a UK Bill of Rights, set up in March 2011 (almost immediately after the February 2011 debate), in its Report of late 2012. The arguments that there should be a UK Bill of Rights to replace the HRA rested, at least in part, on the absence of 'widespread public acceptance of the legitimacy of [the UK's] current human rights structures', in respect of which there was a lack of 'ownership'. 133 The very close adherence to ECHR law provided by the UK courts under the HRA may have prompted considerations related to the quality of that law, and its suitability to the UK, and so indirectly raised questions over Strasbourg review itself. Jack Straw and David Davis MP 134 initiated the February 2011 House of Commons debate, reiterating their full support for the general principles and ideals of human rights protection covered by the ECHR, and laying claim to their own human rights credentials. 135 Neither supported withdrawal from the Convention, or argued that Strasbourg rulings could be freely ignored. But, it was argued, in essence, the Strasbourg Court had aggrandized its jurisdiction and become like a constitutional court, and so, like other such courts, should be subject to some form of democratic override 136 (a point which also arose in the context of domestic debates about the future of the HRA).
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Prisoner voting illustrated the point, it was argued, and for a whole variety of reasons. 135 On Jack Straw MP, see n 127 above. Davis is a former (Conservative) shadow Home Secretary who, in 2008, resigned his position as an MP in order to challenge the then Labour government's approach to civil liberties in the context of anti-terrorism measures, winning the subsequent by-election. 136 This point was pursued by Jack Straw MP, and has been since: see Straw n 130 supra chap 2. He has argued that Strasbourg's interpretation of the Convention as a type of European Bill of Rights lacked constitutional legitimacy, ibid. at 42-43 and 45-46, as it has never properly been sanctioned by the States, who only truly consented to the Court's decisions when it is 'confining itself to those basic rights for which it was established', ibid. 46. The absence of a democratic override was explained by the fact that 'the treaties never anticipated this vastly expanded role for the Court', ibid. at 26. 137 Talk of a 'democratic override' was also relevant to domestic debates about the future of human rights protection in the UK that were underway under the auspices of the (UK) Commission on a Bill of Rights, on which see n 131 supra. As to a 'democratic override', see 'side-letter dated 28 July 2011 from Sir Leigh Lewis KCB (Commission on a Bill of Rights) to Deputy PM Nick Clegg' at 4-5 available at http://www.justice.gov.uk. Various suggestions, none of which were supported by the full Commission, were made: that the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, or Committee of Ministers, or both, might be able to override a Court decision; or that the Committee of Ministers might not enforce a judgment if the 'most senior democratic institution' in the respondent State opposed it; or that 'ground-breaking' violations found by the Court should require some form of consultation (and so approval?) with other Council of Europe institutions. 138 It was argued that for convicted prisoners voting was a privilege, or a civic right, not the human right identified by Strasbourg (a view that was rejected by the Joint Committee on Prisoner Voting Report, see text accompanying n 104 supra) and that what was in issue was a matter of 'penal policy', not raising fundamental rights issues as with cases concerning terrorist deportations or the proper regulation of phone-tapping and the intelligence agencies, areas which were (according to the speaker) properly within the Court's remit, Jack Straw MP ibid. at col 502. More generally, it was argued that the Convention system Straw and Davis cited Lord Hoffmann's 139 well known attack on the Court, in which the later complained that Strasbourg considered itself to be 'the equivalent of the Supreme Court of the United States, laying down a federal law of Europe'. 140 He called for Strasbourg to afford more margin of appreciation, above all in cases when it lacked 'constitutional competence', and given its status as a 'foreign court'. 141 That would recognise the appropriate distribution of powers between Strasbourg judges and the member States with respect to those realms in which the latter had 'not surrendered their sovereign powers'. 142 Other former (and current
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) members of the senior judiciary have spoken in similar, if less direct tones, to Lord Hoffmann. Lord Judge has expressed his 'profound concern' about a 'democratic deficit' 144 arising given the effects of some Strasbourg judgments, with the possible 'gradual emergence of a court with equivalent jurisdiction throughout Europe of that enjoyed by the [US] Supreme Court'. For him 'sovereignty' on issues such as prisoner voting rights (which he referred to explicitly) and was designed to and should protect much more serious rights than those in issue in Hirst, ibid.. It was also said that the Court had misused of the 'living instrument' doctrine, David Davis ibid. at col 497.
It was also argued that British law was reasonable, it being perfectly proper for a legislature to adopt a position whereby a person who had been convicted of a crime that was sufficiently serious to go to prison temporarily lost certain privileges, including the ability to vote (David Davis n 66 supra at col 493 (and see also at 494 referring to a 'social contract' approach)). A further argument was that Art 3 of Prot 1 did not articulate an individual right to vote, and it was clear, or so it was maintained, that the UK never intended or expected it to be interpreted this way when it accepted the Convention and its first Protocol, let alone that some prisoners would derive the vote from it, Ibid. cols 497-498. See, however, the Attorney General's response at col 497 and see n 12 supra (the Joint Committee of Prisoner Voting's view). 139 ('in a debate on Convention issues where there may be more than one civilised view, the balance to be struck between policy and rights, between the judiciary and government, is surely a matter for national constitutions … There may perfectly properly be different answers to some human rights issues in different States on similar facts. I think the Strasbourg court should recognise this. The means of doing so is readily at hand: The doctrine of the margin of appreciation). 144 Lord Judge n 127 supra at [47] . in relation to 'the whole life tariff' 145 -matters on which 'reasonable people will take different views' -'should not be exported' to a 'foreign court '. 146 There is a view, then, supported by politicians and influential former senior judicial figures, that, from time to time, at least, the Court has abused its authority as an international body sitting above the UK, taking undue advantage of its European control power. Or, at the very least, that the Court's role as a type of external European Bill of Rights is resulting in judgments that meddle too much in domestic affairs, constraining the UK's freedom of action inappropriately. One solution, it is said, is that Strasbourg should afford States a greater margin of appreciation -as was argued by the UK government in Hirst and sought by its subsequent challenges to it.
This returns us to the prisoner voting issue, which, for critics of the Court, might be regarded as encapsulating so many of the issues just noted. What is more, as legislative change has been ordered by the Court it encourages direct comparisons to be made between the role of European judges and the domestic judiciary, whose ability to challenge legislation is very limited. The HRA regime leaves Parliament supreme in respect of legislation found to be clearly incompatible with Convention rights.
147 By contrast, despite its international status, Strasbourg has a greater, potential influence. 'Greater' -because, even if Strasbourg does not have express strike down powers, its judgments can make it clear that (on the facts of an individual case) the effects of legislation are contrary to the international legal obligations derived from the Convention, and in certain contexts it has started to order that legislative reform be got underway on the part of a respondent State, as occurred (for the first and only time for the UK, so far) with Greens. 'Potential' -because these are indeed international legal obligations and so Parliamentarians have the reassurance that they still have the 'last word'; even if a Strasbourg ruling requires amendment to primary legislation, British MPs are required to sanction this -they cannot be forced to amend the law.
Yet it is this last point precisely, and that about 'potential' that the prisoner voting issue has brought into acute focus. Put another way, is Parliament's potential to reject Strasbourg largely theoretical in reality, since it would come at such a high political cost? Of course, the Report of the Joint Committee on Prisoner Voting recognised that Parliament could not be forced to do anything in response to Strasbourg's Art 46 orders. It also took the view that the UK was unlikely to be expelled from the Council of Europe for failing to implement Hirst. 148 Then again, it also noted that the possibility of conscious resistance to Strasbourg's Art 46 order (via legislation confirming law known to be contrary to the Convention) had transformed the situation 149 into one that was potentially unprecedented, the political implications being very significant indeed. 150 As the Committee saw it, then, if MPs wanted 'to uphold the United Kingdom's long tradition of respect for and attachment to' the rule of law, the UK should either accept . 147 See S 4, HRA. Hence a declaration of incompatibility has been made in domestic cases challenging the prisoner voting ban, for analysis of the relevant case law, see Chester n 3 supra. 148 See n 7 supra at [109]-100]. 149 So, the British situation on prisoner voting could be distinguished from that reflected by a general tardiness of some States to comply with Strasbourg (it being noted that '[h]uman rights abuses are indeed widespread in many Council of Europe member states, and [that] the governments of those states frequently drag their feet-sometimes for many years-in complying with judgments of the ECtHR against them'), n 7 supra at [100] . 150 See text accompanying n 8 supra.
Hirst or denounce the Convention. 151 For the Committee (or at least a majority of it) Parliamentary sovereignty was 'not an argument against giving effect to' a Strasbourg ruling, 152 i.e. international obligations; rather sovereignty resided 'in Parliament's power to withdraw from the Convention', whereas, whilst the UK was a party to it, obligations were incurred which were not subject to 'cherry picking'.
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What should be done?
The above paragraphs have sought to illustrate why the Court's jurisdiction has become a matter of considerable public debate in the UK. Whatever the merits and demerits of the claim that European judges have been illegitimately 'setting [themselves] up as a supreme court for Europe, with an ever-widening remit', 154 such a view is held by some senior politicians, and apparently, some former senior judges too. In many ways, it seems, prisoner voting has become a focal point for this issue, which has eclipsed the substantive issue itself (i.e. whether some convicted prisoners are enfranchised). The question has also arisen as to what might be done to require the Court to afford more margin of appreciation to States such as the UK.
In that connection we recall the UK- convention system is that of the rule of law. The rule of law must mean that where a court decides and the Brighton Declaration attributed to the UK 159 included passages which were capable of being read as undermining the Court's position as the authoritative interpretative body for the Convention, and it suggested States should benefit from a 'considerable margin of appreciation' in all circumstances when Strasbourg performed the task of human rights review.
It transpired, however, that the Brighton Declaration recognised that the Court already applied the margin of appreciation doctrine, and that it was context-dependent; 160 it also stated that, '[t]he Court authoritatively interprets the Convention', 161 and it underscored the duty of States to abide by and implement Strasbourg judgments.
162 That said, the Declaration encouraged the Court 'to give great prominence' to 'principles such as subsidiarity and the doctrine of margin of appreciation' and 'consistently [apply] these principles in its judgments', 163 the implication being, perhaps, that it did not always afford a sufficient margin in some cases. 'For reasons of transparency and accessibility', it was agreed that, 'a reference to the principle of subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation as developed in the Court's case law should be included in the Preamble to the Convention'. 164 Protocol 15, which is yet to enter into force, envisages this. It will not require the Court to adopt a wide margin of appreciation in all circumstances, and so does not offer the guarantee of restraint on Strasbourg's part that some British politicians may have desired.
And so we return to the 'underlying' debate which formed the context to the Joint Committee on Prisoner Voting's Report. Against the backdrop that has been described in the paragraphs above, should questions over the UK's future relationship with Strasbourg -the legitimacy issue -be linked to MPs' resolution of the prisoner voting issue?
The majority on the Joint Committee on Prisoner Voting were conciliatory; prisoner voting was not the battleground on which the 'underlying debate' should be fought out. 165 For the minority, however, prisoner voting was Parliament's opportunity to debate and, quite possibly, take a stand. It was appreciated that non-compliance with Hirst would give rise to 'serious [political] consequences'; 166 but 'the gravity of the delivers a final and binding judgment, it is complied with -whether it is approved of or not by the authorities concerned. I believe it would be totally destructive of the system if one was to have any kind of system of democratic override: that is, that members of the national parliaments, the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe or, indeed, the Committee of Ministers could simply say: 'This is a decision we don't like and we are not going to implement it'. 159 See Mowbray, 'European Court of Human Rights: May 2011-April 2012' (2012) 18 European Public Law 565 at 566. 160 See Brighton Declaration para B11 (margin of appreciation applied, 'depending on the circumstances of the case and the rights and freedoms engaged'). 161 Brighton Declaration para B10. 162 Brighton Declaration para 3. 163 Brighton Dec para B12(a), emphasis added. 164 Brighton Dec para B12(b), emphasis added. A new paragraph will be added as the final recital to the preamble, as follows: 'Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention.' 165 See supra n 7 at [230], referring to 'the concern of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe [who had appeared as a witness before the Committee] to help the United Kingdom find a way out of the current crisis, which threatens the entire Convention system', [230] . See also [232] referring to popular opinion being opposed to a change in the law, but that 'the debate over prisoner voting has so often been lost in the wider debate over the United Kingdom's relationships both with the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union'. 166 Formal Minutes (deleted paragraph 227). decision before Parliament' entailed that, as a matter of principle, the Bill should have compliant and non-compliant options before it. One recalls here that the February 2011 debate was viewed by many British MPs as a threatened democratic override -and for those determined to take a stand against the Court, its subsequent refusal to reverse Hirst when it had the opportunity to do so (in Scoppola) has been regarded as epitomising of the problem confronting the UK today, i.e. a Court that is not subject to adequate control, and failing to afford a sufficient margin of appreciation to democratic institutions, even when they make their views plain.
The next steps on the part of both the British government and British MPs will be awaited, with the new parliamentary session in the UK due to commence in June 2014. It is possible that a compromise solution will be reached at that stage, or that the matter will be delayed further. Yet even if a resolution is found, it should be noted that the support offered by the majority on the Joint Committee on Prisoner Voting was conditional. The recommendation that the UK should comply with Hirst was accompanied by references to 'the recent and continuing reform of the Court, and… the need for further reform of the Court and in particular of its relationship to democratically elected national legislatures'.
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It seems evident, then, that the broader matter of the UK's relationship with Strasbourg will remain an issue for the future, no matter how the prisoner voting issue may be resolved. In this regard there is a prospect that, as consideration is given to the place of Convention rights under a (potentially) modified domestic regime for human rights protection (reform of the HRA), questions will continue to arise as to the legitimate role for the Court as an external influence on UK law. And in this context the clouds on the horizon are potentially ominous. The Joint Committee's position of December 2013, it will be recalled, was that the UK either accept Strasbourg's rulings or denounce the Convention. Is the latter inconceivable? Two members 168 of the Commission on a Bill of Rights' dissented from the main Report of that particular body (December 2012) finding that there should be a British Bill of Rights, fearing that the push toward domestic reform would be a prelude to the UK's withdrawal from the ECHR itself.
IV -Reflecting on the prisoner voting saga and British challenges to Strasbourg
In the light of our examination of the prisoner voting saga to date, including how the issue has become woven into a broader debate about the UK's relationship with Strasbourg, we are in a position to stand back and reflect. In what follows the writer suggests that there are broad lessons to be learnt from both sides. In essence the arguments set out below proceed as follows. From the UK perspective the debate on the role and influence of the Strasbourg Court needs to gain a sense of proportion. It needs to be recognised that the Convention can have the capacity to act like a type of European Bill of Rights, but that the Court's influence is limited in that regard. At the same time, from Strasbourg's perspective it needs to be recognised that the Court itself is not beyond criticism, and that it may derive some important lessons from the prisoner voting saga.
Strasbourg's influence on prisoner voting
On the prisoner voting issue, the Court's influence (if the law is reformed) has been as follows. It has overridden the British view that it is within the range of reasonable responses to temporarily disenfranchise all those convicted of offences serious enough to merit imprisonment. Instead it has nudged (and no more) the UK toward a mildly more enlightened (from a penological, 'ideal to be attained' (as Judge Costa put it) perspective) view on a key human rights issue -the franchise, and the rights of prisoners. 169 At the heart of the affair, Strasbourg's position is that it is upholding a core principle: the right to vote is a cardinal feature of a democratic society, requiring the adoption of a European standard to the effect that convicted prisoners cannot just be enfranchised en bloc. That outcome is supported by the Joint Committee on Prisoner Voting after its exhaustive examination of the matter.
From the British perspective, central to the controversy, or so it seems, is the fact that the UK Parliament is being required to amend domestic law at the instance of an international court. Then again, if one places the relevant case law in the broader context of the Strasbourg jurisprudence concerning the UK over the years one can strongly argue that, with prisoner voting too, the Court has respected the 'delicate balance ' '] personal choice for that of national democratic institutions'. With respect to the last point arguably the Scoppola (Grand Chamber) judgment upheld a conservative, European consensus, self-restrained line, more in keeping with the approach advocated by the Hirst minority. The point here is that, by the time of 2012 Grand Chamber judgment -and rather fortunately for the Court, perhaps -there was a clear European standard against blanket prisoner voting bans; only six States plus the UK had them, or the equivalent (the figure now being four (Armenia, Bulgaria, Estonia and Russia) plus the UK according to the Joint Prisoner Voting Committee), 171 and the trend against (no doubt influenced by Hirst itself) was in keeping with comparative law. The standard upheld in Scoppola, then, is less susceptible to the accusation of 'judicial legislation' than Hirst (when 13 States retained bans or similar measures) -and especially as in 2012 the Grand Chamber left no doubt at all that the boundaries for law reform were very wide.
The questions for UK politicians, then, may be as follows. Do the minor modifications to domestic law required by Hirst/Scoppola, and other judgments regarded as unwelcome by some, and which require an approach that is more in harmony with a core European one, even though it may displace one that is regarded as reasonable in the British context, really merit defiance of the Court? Alternatively, are such modifications, provided they remain minor and in keeping with the 'delicate balance' (Mahoney) approach, not an inherent feature of being part of the European Convention system and the ideals it protects? In that regard does it not need to be recognised that membership of the Convention involves participation in a scheme for the collective enforcement of certain human rights, the rationale for which is that the domestic law of each State is kept within certain boundaries, Strasbourg being the authoritative interpreter of those boundaries (as the Brighton Declaration acknowledges adopt a restrictive or limited approach to Convention rights). It also means that the Court may, over the objections of the UK Parliament, still legitimately have a lawreforming influence in relation to the effects of legislation that fall outside the European boundaries the Court articulates, especially if the domestic law has become outmoded by a clearly developed European standard, even if the matter relates to an issue of social policy (a basic, rights-based approach to prisoner voting) that British MPs would prefer not to adopt. Evidently, this requires recognition of a more positive role for the Court, and the Convention, than that associated with crude arguments that its influence is illegitimate as it has aggrandised its jurisdiction, and as it is a 'foreign' court, prisoner voting being exclusively a matter for 'democratically-elected' lawmakers. The debate requires acknowledgment that being part of the Convention system entails an acceptance of the Strasbourg regime as a type of European Bill of Rights, with the ability to 'foster a broad congruence in the constitutional arrangements to be shared by a range of neighbouring states based on democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights'.
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The Court's capacity to act in this way is hardly controversial, for its long-standing function in that regard was acknowledged to the extent that Convention rights and the Strasbourg jurisprudence were made the central focus of the the HRA regime back in 1998.
So, with respect to the UK's future relationship with Strasbourg, it is submitted that there needs to be a mature debate about the role of the Convention and the Court, and what it means to be part of the Strasbourg system. 174 The debate needs to be based on facts, rather than a perception that Strasbourg readily overturns the decisions of democratically-elected representatives and domestic courts, and a clear understanding of why it has done so, when it has. But that must also encompass a careful debate on what the proper role and remit of the Strasbourg Court is. British criticisms of the absence of a democratic override within the Strasbourg system should then be seen in the context of a serious examination of whether such a mechanism is genuinely required (let alone whether it is compatible with the ECHR), given the limited influence of the Court in practice, and whether the safeguards that exist within the Strasbourg system to check against overly-creative judgments (however that be defined) are already appropriate. Any future debate should also encompass a full and proper consideration of the broader role the Court plays in the pan-European context, that is across the 47 member State Council of Europe.
Messages from the reform process being heard in Strasbourg?
But this does not mean that the Court itself has no lessons to derive from the prisoner voting saga, and events related to it. It is submitted that it does -but that matters also need to be seen in the context of the reform process that has been underway since the Interlaken Conference of 2010, which included the Brighton Declaration of April 2012.
To be clear, that Declaration and its immediate predecessors addressed a whole host of vitally important matters to do with the Court's sustainability and future operation. 175 The reform process has demonstrated the very considerable support for the Court that exists across Europe, and the genuine desire to preserve the system. That said, other important aspects of the Brighton Declaration clearly have a resonance with aspects of the prisoner voting saga that we have examined. The need for clarity and consistency on the part of the Court (generally speaking, rather than with respect to 173 Sales, 'Strasbourg jurisprudence and the HRA: A Response to Lord Irvine', (2012) Public Law 253 at 266. 174 It must be conceded that, for some at least, the question of the UK's broader relations with Europe are inextricably linked to this; for further insights see Kennedy and Sands n 122, at 229-230. 175 On the Declaration generally, see Patrick, 'Building on Brighton: a foundation for the future of the European Court of Human Rights?', (2012) 9(1) Justice Journal 32. prisoner voting specifically) was prominent in the Declaration, the call being for a clear Strasbourg jurisprudence, 176 the States directly linking this issue, it should be emphasized, to the Court's 'credibility' and 'authority'. 177 The Brighton Declaration also highlighted the importance of the Court not departing from settled precedents without cogent reasons, and it was invited 'in particular… to have regard to the importance of consistency where judgments relate to aspects of the same issue, so as to ensure their cumulative effect continues to afford States Parties an appropriate margin of appreciation'. 178 The 'central role' of the Grand Chamber as a means of ensuring consistency was emphasised.
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These comments prompt us to recall the ambiguity of Hirst; did the Frodl judges take advantage of this? From the perspective of the Court's limited remit as an international court of human rights, Frodl surely was activist, having the appearance of a personal crusade to improve European law on prisoner voting. It should have been reheard by the Grand Chamber as part of its 'central role', rather than the indirect rehearing of it that occurred in Scoppola (Grand Chamber). In this regard, one may note that since 'Brighton' the Court has changed its Rules, relinquishment to the Grand Chamber being required 'where the resolution of a question raised in a case before the chamber might have a result inconsistent with the Court's case-law'. 180 In recent years the Court has also improved its internal mechanisms for case law consistency.
The Court's receptivity to messages concerning the importance of the principle of subsidiarity communicated to it during the reform process, including by the UK government, 181 also appears to be in evidence. There has been a very notable emphasis on the notion of dialogue between European judges and domestic courts in recent years, 182 something which has been encouraged by the Brighton Declaration. 183 The Strasbourg judges are apparently seeking to make it clear that European control is not dictatorial but involves working partnerships between institutions operating at the international and domestic levels. President Spielmann has highlighted 'recent case-law' involving the margin of appreciation as revealing 'a trend towards judicial self-restraint when it is clear that the superior national courts have, at the domestic level, examined the case in light of the relevant Convention provision and case-law principles'. 184 Referring to 176 The Brighton Declaration paras 23 (especially) and 24. The Court was also encouraged to take 'a strict and consistent approach in declaring [manifestly ill-founded] applications inadmissible, clarifying its case law to this effect as necessary', at para C15(d). 177 The Brighton Declaration para 21, and see also Preamble para 5. 178 Brighton Declaration para E 25(c). 179 It was decided that Art 30 of the Convention should be amended to remove the words 'unless one of the parties to the case objects' (see, now, Protocol 15 to the ECHR, Art 3). Brighton Dec para E 25(d) and (e). Section E also emphasised the importance of having a high calibre bench and expressing approval of the measures being taken to improve the quality of the selection process for Strasbourg judges, paras E 21, 22, 24, 25(a) and (b the Animal Defenders International 185 ruling it was noted that the same approach was apparent 'in relation to national Parliaments':
'where legislators carefully weigh up the relevant human rights aspects of a piece of legislation, and seek to achieve a reasonable accommodation between individual rights and others aspects of public interest, the Court has shown itself inclined to accept the balance that has been struck'. 186 This approach leaves the Court -the authoritative body in interpreting the Convention -with the final say on whether the 'balance' struck is reasonable. The crucial issue, of course, is how deferential it will be in any case in the performance of that scrutiny -how much margin of appreciation will the Court afford? In this regard, Protocol 15 foresees an amendment to the Convention's Preamble, but the new text will not direct the Court how to apply the margin of appreciation. 187 Arguably, then, the Court's independence has been upheld, 188 whilst President Spielmann has downplayed the significance of this aspect of Protocol 15. 189 Then again, according to former President Costa, the new Preamble does send a 'clear' 'message': 'governments (or some of them) wish to compel the Court to exercise increased self-restraint [more margin of appreciation, presumably] in its scrutiny, especially when sensitive human rights issues arise or when national Parliaments are involved'. Costa identified prisoner voting as the 'most obvious example of this'. 190 The real issue, of course, as Hirst demonstrated, is how the Court actually employs the margin of appreciation in any given case. Here, we may recall the division between the majority and minority in that case. With an eye to lessons to be learnt by the Court, we may note that Hirst, Frodl, Greens and Scoppola apparently demonstrated some breadth of opinion as to the Court's legitimate standard setting function, and the role of the margin of appreciation. Can European judges prioritise the Convention right in question over national interests and inspire a certain measure of law reform absent a strong (or very strong) European consensus on the matter in issue? Can they perform their own, independent constitutional-rights/ proportionality analysis of the measures employed by a State to restrict human rights 191 potentially setting a 'landmark precedent for the protection of prisoners' voting rights in Europe'? 192 It would seem that the judges in Frodl would have answered these questions mainly in the affirmative. Arguably the Hirst minority (more reliance being placed on European consensus, and the margin of appreciation) would have answered them mainly in the negative, adopting a cautious and self-restrained approach. The majority in Hirst (if there was a single, majority approach) may have lay someone in between; it was rather ambiguous, as we have seen. As noted above, it is submitted that the Court's final word on the issue, in Scoppola, reflected a more limited conceptualisation of Strasbourg's status and influence.
This author contends that the amended Preamble should serve as a reminder to the Strasbourg judges of the limitations on their role, and the need to confine it strictly to the 'delicate balance' function identified by Mahoney. 193 In this regard it is submitted that Hirst may be open to criticism. The author's personal view is that the Hirst minority were correct; that judgment was a bold decision for its day (but, it may be stressed, not outrageously so) for an international court to adopt, and Frodl even more so. That said, it is also arguable that the Grand Chamber ruling in Scoppola amounted to an appropriate self-correction, even though the Court did not acknowledge this (as it might have).
Moreover, it is suggested that, generally speaking, Grand Chamber cases of recent years have demonstrated a cautious approach on the Court's part, especially when dealing with matters that relate to social policy. 194 This issue merits more detailed study, but if the author's impressions are correct the Court has been in listening mode with respect to subsidiarity (more broadly defined), and trends in the jurisprudence chime with the comments made by its Deputy-Registrar, Michael O'Boyle, back in 2011 (i.e. before the Brighton Declaration, and before the full escalation of the prisoner voting issue, which he was not commenting directly upon). For the Court to maintain its authority, he argued, it needs to proceed with caution and restraint, 195 striving for 'a better balance between judicial self-restraint and judicial activism in its decision-making'. Strasbourg Judges, he argued, had to develop the law carefully and incrementally to avoid 'friction between the national and the international spheres', and 'a crisis of confidence that would undermine the entire system'. 196 To that end 'constant vigilance' was required to ensure that the balance between orderly progression of the case law and States' confidence in the system was not upset 'in a busy court composed of five sections'. A key role for the Grand Chamber President was to 'counsel restraint', and to emphasise that Strasbourg judges are not 'members of a constitutional court with a corresponding latitude of vision but… judges of an international court subject to a particular philosophy of legal interpretation that has been well articulated in many of the leading judgments… and accepted by many generations of judges'. 197 Its members should not set the law in accordance with what the judges think it ought to be, rather they should adopt 'an orderly approach to the development of legal principles '. 198 O'Boyle's comments invite some final observations on the evolution of Strasbourg's case law on prisoner voting, and the UK's resistance thus far to Hirst. Looking back to that judgment today -with the benefit of hindsight, of course -and recalling the division between the majority and majority, one can see how the Court could have adopted an alternative approach. It could have found no violation on the specific facts of Hirst (the applicant having been convicted of manslaughter, and so, presumably, could have been disenfranchised under a post-Scoppola regime). By doing so, however, it would not have had to abdicate a European standard setting role, simply deferring to the UK position by reference to a wide margin of appreciation. Rather, concluding that there was no violation, the Court could still have started to set down general principles with respect to prisoner voting rights, indicating that the effects of the blanket ban on convicted prisoners itself were vulnerable to a future legal challenge, given that that ban was (i) closed to considerations as to proportionality in respect of (ii) the emergence of a clear European-norm on a rights-based approach to prisoner enfranchisement in Europe. 199 Later on, when the European consensus on that second point had hardened, it might have found a violation on the individual facts of an appropriate case, for example one involving a very short sentence or a minor offence, 200 explaining in clear and compelling terms why this was justified (for example, as there was a clear European consensus against disenfranchisement for such minor offences, and/or because the effects of the ban had been demonstrated to be arbitrary and haphazard on the facts of the case 201 ). Of course, this would not have guaranteed cooperation on the part of British MPs. Then again, such a step-by-step, and incremental approach would accord with the one traditionally adopted by the Court. It would have required it to accept a slower pace of reform, but it might have softened the impact of Strasbourg review, provided a more solid, and nuanced, basis upon which to override the position of British MPs, and increased the opportunities for (a much needed) 'dialogue' with the relevant national authorities.
In contrast, by advancing the way it did in a Grand Chamber ruling (Hirst) -which could not be reversed without detracting from the Court's authority -, arguably Strasbourg took unnecessary risks, and all the more so to the extent (for it was not entirely clear) that it considered itself entitled to find a violation given the absence of a serious, modern debate on the prisoner voting issue by British MPs. 202 The issue here is that, as the Secretary General of the Council of Europe has noted, the Court's future authority might unravel when faced with a clear refusal to comply by a State such as the UK, in particular. Arguably, then, in the brinkmanship that occurred over 2011-2012, the Court needed the UK to comply with its judgment in Hirst and, one would suggest, sought compromise -the Scoppola Grand Chamber ruling arguably reflecting this. To the extent that that Grand Chamber judgment did grant the UK a greater margin of appreciation than Hirst -or even appeared to do so -it risks being seen as a demonstration of the 'weight' 203 that British MPs successfully brought to 'bear' on Strasbourg. The danger for the Court may be that this will be noted not just in the UK, but across Europe, in other countries that have started to express concern about the Court's influence, 204 and who may, therefore, start to adopt similar tactics to those engaged by British MPs, if not the UK government. Before Brighton, for example, there were initiatives before the Dutch Parliament to press for a greater margin of appreciation, 205 although ultimately the Senate passed a resolution supporting the Court. 206 There have been hostile reactions elsewhere in Europe in respect of individual judgments against particular States.
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What the prisoner voting saga has demonstrated, then, is that the enforcement of certain Court judgments, and even its Art 46 orders may be subject to a certain amount of brinkmanship. After all, it was British MPs' threatened resistance, growing out of their private debate, that gave the British government an apparently respectable basis to return to Strasbourg seeking the reversal of Hirst. It trod a fine line doing so; it did not suffer the punitive element of European control, i.e. the reputational damage of directly defying the Court, but pressure was still exerted upon Strasbourg, the UK government arguing arguing (somewhat disingenuously, perhaps) that it was in a constitutional fix, being caught in the crossfire of disagreement between European judges and democraticallyelected MPs. This would not be a good defence at international law for a failure to implement the international obligations underlying a Strasbourg judgment; then again, it is a reminder that the Court is an international institution whose authority cannot be taken for granted. The Court must be aware that if national legislatures were to adopt such obstructive strategies it could be very damaging indeed for it in the longer term. To be clear, the author's point here is not that the Court must kowtow to national legislatures, but that it needs to proceed with caution and self-restraint, so that it is on very solid ground when risking future confrontations.
V -Conclusion
This article has set out the unfolding story (to date) of the prisoner voting saga. The substantive issue (prisoner voting) has become intertwined with broader constitutional questions for the UK regarding the place and status of European human rights law, both in terms of domestic law, but also as regards UK membership of the Convention itself.
It remains to be seen whether some convicted prisoners will be able to vote in the next general election in the UK, scheduled for May 2015 (or the European Parliament elections of 2014). The bigger issue, of course, is what stance MPs will adopt in terms of whether they are prepared to consciously defy the Court on Hirst, given the broader, potential implications of doing so, not just for the UK, but for the Convention system overall. 208 Here it is submitted, and in agreement with the majority view of the Joint Committee on Prisoner Voting, Strasbourg's impact on UK law needs to be brought into perspective. Its influence on prisoner voting has been limited, and its ability to correct itself, albeit under pressure from the UK, has been demonstrated.
It also remains to be seen to what extent the UK's adherence to the ECHR might be a feature of the May 2015 election campaign. Here we have noted 209 that dissenting voices on the Commission on a UK Bill of Rights feared that possible future reform of the HRA would be a preliminary step to withdrawal from the Convention itself. It seems that, if elected, the Conservative party intend to reform the HRA, whilst some senior Conservative politicians have indicated that withdrawal from the ECHR is not inconceivable. 210 The Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights has argued that the UK should indeed withdraw from the Convention, rather than undermine it by picking and choosing which judgments to implement, 211 a position which the Joint Committee on Prisoner Voting has, in effect, endorsed. But could such a momentous step really occur? At what cost? The political cost of withdrawal should not be underestimated for the UK. As for the ECHR system, the price could be very high too. For his part, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe has expressed concern that other States could follow a British withdrawal, there being 'forces in many countries that dislike being under an international court', 212 and referring to the crisis in Crimea as one which demonstrated the importance of having 'a common legal basis'.
Summing up, the UK's relationship with Strasbourg looks set to be a topic of considerable public debate in the years ahead, and even have a wider influence on the continuing evolution of the Convention. The fact that UK withdrawal from the ECHR is being referred to even as a remote possibility entails that it is imperative that there be a thorough and mature debate about the momentous implications of that. The prisoner voting issue (and other cases regarded as unwelcome intrusions into UK law, by some) needs to be seen with a sense of proportion and a broader context concerning the role of the Court in Europe. At the same time it is suggested above that the Court is not immune from criticism either, 213 and whilst, with respect to prisoner voting, it was not bullied into submission by the threats from one State, it may have lessons to learn from the saga and the challenge brought to it by the UK. In that connection there should be a very careful appreciation, too, of the positive changes brought about by the reform process that has been underway at Strasbourg since Interlaken, and how British challenges to the legitimacy of the Court, the resolution of the prisoner voting issue, and the broader matter of the UK's continued membership of the Convention could have a significant destabilising impact on this. 
